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We review the role of economic theory in shaping the process of legal change in Russia 
during the two transitions it experienced during the course of the twentieth century: the 
transition to a socialist economy organised along the lines of state ownership of the means of 
production in the 1920s, and the transition to a market economy which occurred after the fall 
of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.  Despite differences in methodology and in policy 
implications, Marxist theory, dominant in the 1920s, and neoclassical economics, dominant 
in the 1990s, offered a similarly reductive account of law as subservient to wider economic 
forces.  In both cases, the subordinate place accorded to law undermined the transition 
process.  Although path dependence and history are frequently invoked to explain the limited 
development of the rule of law in Russia during the 1990s, policy choices driven by a 
deterministic conception of law and economics also played a role. 
 




It has often been observed that, in the aftermath of its transition from socialism to capitalism 
in the 1990s, Russia has failed to become a ‘rule of law’ state in any generally accepted sense 
of that term.   As a normative goal the ‘rule of law’ is a ‘profoundly contested concept’,1 but 
at the level of practice there is general consensus that it is bound up with the idea of legal 
autonomy, that is, of a legal system which is independent from and placed above both the 
government and powerful private interests.
2
  In 2014 the World Justice Project ranked Russia 
80th. out of 99 countries surveyed for its Rule of Law Index, largely because the Russian 
judicial system was perceived as being deeply affected by corruption from vested interests 
and by political interference.
3
  There is a long history of associating the Russian legal system 
with the instrumentalisation of the state and its subjection to private interests, which some 
identify with the origins of the Kievan Rus itself.
4
  Others emphasise the comparative 
isolation of Russia as the rule of law was developing in Europe
5
 and the marginal place of 
law in society in the early Soviet period,
6
 as well as more recent causes including the 
corrosion of institutions associated with the Soviet system and the consequences of the 
privatisations of the 1990s.
7
  In this article we focus on a relatively neglected aspect of this 
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 namely the way in which understandings of the law-economy relation in Russia have 
been shaped, at critical junctures, by theories and policies premised on the subservience of 
the legal system to economic forces, and we explore the implications of this for contemporary 
Russia. 
 
Russia’s first transition, from a semi-formed capitalist system to one based on the principles 
of state-organised socialism, took place in the decade and a half following the revolution of 
1917.  The second transition, which was initiated by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1992, 
involved a conscious attempt to (re-)establish a market economy.  During both periods, there 
was considerable interest in and debate over the role of the legal system in the transition 
process, and attempts to embed the lessons of prevailing theories in the design of legal 
institutions.  Superficially, the dominant conceptions of law in the two transitions – the 
Marxist theory of law, in the first one, and the neoclassical economic analysis of law, in the 
second – could not be further apart.  At a deeper level, we will suggest, they have much in 
common.  They both view the legal system as the expression of an underlying economic 
reality and conceive legal change in terms of the alignment of law to that reality.  In the 
context of transition, both saw transformative political action as the principal mechanism of 
change.  In the 1990s as in the 1920s, it was anticipated that the legal system, rather than 
operating as a mechanism of societal change in its own right, would adjust, ex post, to the 
transformations initiated in the economic and political spheres.  This understanding of the 
law-economy relation was to have profound implications for the transition process in both 
periods. 
 
The aim of this paper is to review and compare the experience of legal change in Russia 
during these two periods of transformation.  The story of the Soviet attempt to build a post-
legal social order during the 1920s, and of its failure when set against the rise of ‘socialist 
legality’ and state planning in the 1930s, generated a large literature beyond Russia in the 
middle decades of the twentieth century.  Our purpose in revisiting the experience of the first 
transition is not to add to this literature, which was largely concerned with internal debates 
within Marxist thought and related aspects of legal theory, but to focus attention on ideas and 
events which, we will suggest, have direct relevance to the experience of transition in today’s 
emerging markets. Thus our contribution is to the study of the role of ideas in the formation 
of policy and specifically to the part played by economic theory in shaping legal reform in 
periods of institutional transition.  When we set aside the ideological differences between 
Marxism and neoliberalism, we observe striking continuities in their understanding of the 
transition process, and we see the same mistakes being made in the (mis)application of 
economic theory to legal reforms.   
 
We begin by examining in sections 2 and 3 the translation of ideas from economic theory into 
legal institutions, the difficulties encountered in the operation of those institutions once they 
were in place, and the eventual outcomes, for each of the two transition periods.  In section 4 
we review our findings with the aim of obtaining a clearer understanding of the role of law in 
transitions of whole societies from one dominant mode of economic organisation to another.  
This issue is of interest in the context of many contemporary societies, sometimes called 
‘post-transition’ systems, which have recently experienced the shift from state ownership and 
control of the means of production to a market economy characterised by private ownership 
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of enterprise and the use of markets to achieve resource allocation.  How the law functions to 
encourage and underpin market-based economic relations is still far from being completely 
understood even in the context of societies which have supposedly reached an ‘advanced’ or 




2. The first transition: law and economy in the early Soviet Union 
 
2.1 The Marxist theory of law and Soviet legal thought 
 
Consistently with Lenin’s interpretation of Marxist thought, the Soviet system which was put 
in place following the 1917 revolution was constructed on the principle of government 
seizure of all revenue-generating property and the regulation of all economic activity.
9
 This 
was coupled with the subordination of government itself to control by the Communist party 
elite, consisting of its senior officials (nomenklatura) and security services.  Soviet society 
was modelled along the lines of a consciously teleological project with the achievement of a 
post-market social order as its goal.
10
  The place of law in this transition was a focus of 
debates which, while at one level highly abstract and theoretical, also had concrete 
applications.  The leading jurists were actively engaged in law reform initiatives, while 
politicians, up to and including Lenin and Stalin themselves, publicly commented on legal-
theoretical issues which were seen to have a bearing on party dogma. 
 
Marx and Engels had written almost nothing systematic about law, and the subsequent 
construction of a Marxist theory of law was largely a work of extrapolation from isolated 
texts, written decades apart.
11
  In the ‘Preface’ to the Contribution to a Critique of Political 
Economy,
12
 written in 1859, Marx had referred to the ‘social relations of production’ as ‘the 
economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political 
superstructure’.  The same passage had described ‘property relations’ as a ‘legal expression 
for’ the social relations of production.  These remarks came to be interpreted as the basis for a 
‘materialist’ theory of law which regarded legal concepts and processes as expressions of a 
deeper reality consisting of economic relations. 
 
In 1875, in a communication to the organisers of the Gotha unity congress which led to the 
formation of the German Socialist Workers’ Party, which was eventually published in 1891 
under Engels’ instruction as The Critique of the Gotha Programme,13 Marx and Engels had 
written that in the ‘first phase’ of a communist society which would emerge ‘after prolonged 
birth pangs from capitalist society’, law could not ‘be higher than the economic structure of 
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society and its cultural development conditioned thereby’.  The ‘narrow horizon’ of 
bourgeois law could only be overcome, they wrote, in a ‘higher phase’ of society in which 
‘the productive forces have… increased with the all-around development of the individual, 
and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly’.   This would be a society 
organised according to the principle, ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to 
his needs’.14  This passage came to be read as implying, by Soviet jurists among others, that 
in the transition from capitalism to communism, law, as an expression of capitalist economic 
relations, would gradually fade or ‘wither’ away.  
 
The use of Marxist theory to develop a ‘general theory’ of law, that is to say, one capable of 
identifying the nature of law and of explaining the functioning of the different branches and 
subdivisions of the legal system, was the distinctive contribution of the Soviet jurist Evgeny 
Pashukanis in his landmark text The General Theory of Law and Marxism, first published in 
1924.
15
  The General Theory became the basis for the leading school of thought in Soviet 
legal analysis during the late 1920s and early 1930s, and Pashukanis played a prominent role 
in drafting laws and in the administration of the legal system at this time. Pashukanis’s book 
owed its wide influence to a number of factors, not least the striking critique it offered of law 
and capitalist economic relations, which resonated beyond the borders of the Soviet Union 
and was acknowledged at the time and subsequently as a significant contribution to legal 
theory.
16
  Of more immediate relevance to our current argument, Pashukanis succeeded, at 
least for a while, in articulating a theory of law which matched the political needs of 1920s 
Soviet Russia. 
 
Pashukanis’s analysis began where Marx’s left off, in emphasising the ‘indissoluble internal 
connection between the categories of the economy based on the commodity and on money, 
and the legal form itself’.17  Private law, which expresses social relations in terms of abstract 
juridical concepts, is capitalist law, or ‘the legal superstructure as such’.18  The emergence of 
this type of legal order is a historically contingent event: ‘it is only with the advent of 
bourgeois-capitalist society that all the necessary conditions are created for the juridical 
factor to attain complete distinctness in social relations’.19 In Pashukanis’s account, law is 
both an expression of the capitalist system and a means of legitimating it, if only on a 
contingent and temporary basis.   Capitalist society is ‘above all a society of commodity 
owners’ who must ‘recognise in each other the rights of proprietors’.20 Commodity owners 
are ‘guided by naked economic calculation’ and it is this ‘egoism’, together with freedom to 
contract and the ‘equality of all human personalities’ which make up the social relation of 
commodity exchange.
21
 The concept of legal personality functions to describe social reality 
in juridical terms, just as the notion of the ‘egoistic, economic subject’ operates in political 
economy. Morality is simply the rule of exchange between commodity owners, and when 
abstracted from the context of commodity production, the ‘basic concepts of morality are 
meaningless.’ It further follows that ‘the very concept of justice is drawn from the exchange 
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relationship, and expresses nothing outside of it’, so that in a capitalist society there are ‘no 
independent and absolute criteria in the idea of justice’.22 
 
Pashukanis’s identification of autonomous, juridical law with capitalism itself implied a 
particular theory of the transition process.  Pashukanis argued that ‘the withering away of 
bourgeois law (the categories as such, not this or that precept) in no way implies their 
replacement by new categories of proletarian law’.23  Rather, the transition to developed 
communism should be conceived as the ‘withering away of the bourgeois form of law as 
such, as a liberation of that heritage of the bourgeois epoch which is fated to outlive the 
bourgeoisie itself’.24   
 
Pashukanis’s theory met the need on the part of the then Soviet orthodoxy to rebut 
movements within Marxist legal thought which, at the mid-1920s, were arguing for the 
potential of gradualist legal change to effect a reform of capitalism from within. Addressing 
the argument
25
 that private law could adjust to reflect the emergence of the modern regulatory 
and welfare state as a reaction to the extremes of the market order, Pashukanis asserted the 
need ‘to raise one’s voice against any attempt to blur over the fundamental contradictions 
between capitalism and socialism, to veil, with the help of cleverly devised “transformations 
of civil law”, the class nature of capitalist private property and to attach the label of a “social 
function” to it’.26  The transition process had to involve radical political change of the kind 
experienced in Soviet Russia after 1917: ‘the anti-social aspects of private property can only 
be eliminated de facto, that is, by the development of the planned socialist economy at the 
expense of the market economy’.27 
 
At the same time, Pashukanis’s theory offered a rationale for the survival of certain aspects of 
bourgeois (or private) law, along with private property relations, in the early years of the 
Soviet Union. The New Economic Policy (NEP) of the early 1920s had involved an 
acceptance of a continuing role for private enterprise and production, in an attempt to achieve 
a basic level of economic growth after the privations of the civil war period which ended in 
1922.
28
 The NEP was a ‘tactical retreat’ which was justified by the impossibility of Russia 
passing directly from a semi-feudal society to a socialist one, without first experiencing a 
form of market economy, however limited.
29
  The Civil Code of 1922 recognised the right of 
all citizens ‘to choose any occupation and profession not prohibited by law, to acquire and 
alienate property within the limitations established by law, to enter into legal transactions and 
to incur obligations, and to organise industrial and commercial enterprises in compliance with 
all decrees regulating industrial and commercial activities and protecting hired labour’ 
(Article 5) and also stated that ‘no-one may be deprived of civil-law rights or limited in rights 
except in the cases and in the manner prescribed by the law’ (Article 6).  According to the 
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senior Soviet jurist at the time of the Code’s drafting, Pyotr Stuchka, the Code was ‘the 
economic policy of our transition period, or more precisely the NEP, put into the form of 
articles of law’.30 
 
These protections were nevertheless qualified by Article 1 of the Civil Code which stated that 
‘civil-law rights shall be protected by law, except in those instances where they are exercised 
in contradiction to their socio-economic purpose’, while Article 4 referred to private rights 
and obligations being granted ‘for the purpose of the development of the productive forces of 
society’. Stuchka referred to these provisions as a ‘sword of Damocles’, making both civil 
rights and legal capacity contingent on an ill-defined state policy.
31
  The Civil Code was 
characteristic of measures at this time which were a hybrid of pre-revolutionary legal models 
and an emerging model of Soviet law which was to expose the fault lines in the theory of 
transition.  
  
2.2 From ‘revolutionary legality’ to ‘Soviet law’ 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik coup in 1917, the concept of ‘revolutionary 
legality’ was used to articulate the principle that legal rights of all kinds were to be 
subordinated to the purposes of the revolution.  Decree no 1 published on 7 December 1917 
abolished the Tsarist legal system, the Procuracy and the Bar, and introduced a new system of 
revolutionary tribunals and people’s courts, with the intention of enabling citizens to settle 
their disputes simply.
32
 An administrative decree of 1919 stated that the role of the criminal 
law was to defend the social structure of existing society against violations by repressive 
measures. However it failed to list those offences that were considered to be crimes and left it 
to the discretion of the judge to decide whether an act was dangerous to society. The same 
decree also provided that punishments should not be used to inflict injurious or needless 
suffering, but this only applied in the case of ‘non-political’ offences such as theft.33 The 
Criminal Code of 1926 stipulated that ‘if any socially dangerous act has not been directly 
provided for by the present code, the basis and extent of liability for it is determined by 
applying to it those articles of the Code which deal with offences most similar in nature.’  A 
‘socially dangerous act’ meant any act which could be ‘dangerous’ to the revolution.34 
 
Pashukanis’s theory saw criminal law under capitalism as a mechanism used by bourgeois 
society to support the class system, that is, as a manifestation of organized class violence. The 
criminal process was a variant of commodity exchange, reflecting the principle of 
equivalence:  ‘the prosecutor, as expected of a “party”, asks a “high price”..... the criminal 
seeks leniency, a “discount”, the judge decrees “according to justice”’.35 Under the bourgeois 
criminal justice system, the degree of punishment varied according to the extent of 
intentionality or responsibility; the idea of responsibility reflected the sense of ‘punishment… 
as a method of payment’.  Thus the criminal law ‘like the law in general, is a form of 
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intercourse between isolated egoistic subjects’; as crime and punishment were ‘necessary 
determinants of legal form’, their gradual disappearance in the transition from a market 
society would be ‘the surest sign that the narrow horizon of bourgeois law is finally opening 
up before us’.36  Conversely, the practice of revolutionary legality in the administration of the 
criminal law could be justified as a form of ‘social defence’ which was ‘regulated by 
technical rules’ rather than by ‘legal principle’.37   
 
But as the course of Soviet economic and legal development unfolded, it became more 
difficult to maintain the view that legal structures were ‘withering away’.  Stuchka’s 1927 
article ‘Soviet law’ argued that because of ‘the extreme length of the transitional period there 
has naturally been formed a special Soviet law for the transitional period.  This obviously 
contains elements of bourgeois law, but in essence it introduces profound changes into all 
social relations, including law’.38  In 1928 the first five-year plan was initiated, and the mixed 
economy of the NEP formally repudiated.  By 1932 private ownership and trade had been 
almost entirely suppressed, at least with respect to the formal economy.  Pashukanis’s 
commodity exchange theory came increasingly into conflict with an emerging concept of 
Soviet law which was distinct from ‘bourgeois law’.  
 
The question of how to interpret the persistence of law in the transition period turned on the 
nature of the relationship between the economic ‘base’, consisting of the social relations of 
production and other aspects of material social reality, and the ‘superstructure’ of which the 
legal system was deemed to be a part.  This implied that there was a limit to how far law 
could be used as an instrument of social change during the transition period; law was 
essentially a reflection of economic relations.   Consistently with the view expressed by Marx 
and Engels on the transition process,
39
 Pashukanis argued that the legal form could only be 
transcended through ‘the gradual transition from equivalent distribution… to the formula of 
developed communism’.40   
 
Although the withering away of law would begin as soon as power had been wrested from the 
ruling class, it would not be completed overnight; moreover, in Marxist terms, the process 
was to be thought of as a dialectical one. Thus while, over the long run, law reflected the 
economy, at particular conjunctions law could influence economic and social developments.   
Engels had suggested that ‘the various elements of the superstructure’, including ‘juridical 
forms’, would ‘exercise their influence over the course of the historical struggles and in many 
ways determine their form in particular’.41 Engels also thought that while law expressed 
economic relations in general terms, the need for juridical order meant that it was constrained 
to do so in an ‘internally consistent way’ which implied some departure from the ‘faithful 
reflection of economic conditions’.42 This opened up a space for legal autonomy and 
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therefore, by extension, for the preservation of a role for the legal system after the inception 
of the socialist state.  Lenin had written that in a state formed by a socialist revolution, law 
would begin to ‘wither away immediately’, but he had also stated that the bourgeois state 
would only disappear once ‘the possibility of exploitation no longer exists anywhere’.43  
Exactly what Lenin had meant when, in a similar vein, he had written that ‘under 
communism not only does bourgeois law remain for a certain time but so does the bourgeois 
state, without the bourgeoisie’,44 was a matter of much dispute among jurists during the 
1920s.
45
  In the General Theory, Pashukanis argued that while ‘seizure of political power by 
the proletariat is the fundamental prerequisite of socialism’, the experience of transition had 
shown that ‘planned production and distribution cannot replace market exchange and the 
market as the link between individual economic units overnight’. Relations between state-
owned enterprises and smaller firms would continue to be governed by contractual relations 
during the transition period even though in this case the legal form ‘exists for the sole 
purpose of being utterly spent’.46 Pashukanis envisaged empirical research being conducted 
to track the transition process in which the commodity form would be transcended and the 
legal superstructure would progressively dissolve,
47
 a project that was never fulfilled. 
 
In 1930, Stalin’s speech to the Sixteenth Party Congress addressed the issue explicitly, in a 
way which cast doubt on the feasibility of law’s disappearance: 
 
We are for the withering away of the state, and at the same time, we are for the 
strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which represents the mightiest and 
most powerful authority of all forms of state that have ever existed. The highest 
development of the state power for the purpose of preparing conditions for the 
withering away of state power… this is the Marxist formula.48 
 
In this vein, Pashukanis’s 1932 article ‘Theory of State and Law’ argued that Soviet law, in 
protecting ‘the interest of the working majority, the suppression of class elements hostile to 
the proletariat, and the defence of socialist construction’ was ‘radically different from 
bourgeois law, despite the formal resemblance of individual statutes’.49  His 1935 textbook 
on Soviet economic law still rejected the concept of ‘proletarian law’, but did acknowledge 
the idea that Soviet law expressed the interests of the working class as the ruling class under 
socialism.
50
 In a 1936 paper he referred to the ‘mistake’ of arguing that law was a bourgeois 
form that ‘cannot be filled with a socialist content and which must wither away in proportion 
to the realisation of such content’ in favour of arguing that Soviet law was ‘the law of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and since, in so doing, consideration of course has to be given to the whole legal system 
already in operation, the juristic form is, in consequence, made everything and the economic 
content nothing. Public law and private law are treated as independent spheres, each being 
capable of and needing a systematic presentation by the consistent elimination of all inner 
contradictions’ (Engels 1946). 
43
  Lenin 1964, p 488. See the discussion of Head 2008, p 52. 
44
  Lenin 1970, p 138. 
45
  See Head 2008, p 51. 
46
  Pashukanis 2009, p 133. 
47
  Ibid. 
48
  Reproduced in Beirne and Sharlet (eds.) 1980, p 234. 
49
  Beirne and Sharlet (eds.) 1980, p 297. 
50
  Beirne and Sharlet (eds.) 1980, p 305. 
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proletarian state which serves as an instrument in the construction of socialism’.51  The shift 
towards ‘socialist legality’ culminated in the 1936 Constitution, which according to 
Pashukanis’s critic Vyshinsky signified that ‘under socialism… law is raised to the highest 
level of development’.52   
 
Pashukanis was arrested in January 1937 and was executed shortly afterwards.  His place as 
doyen of the Soviet legal profession and principal spokesman on legal theory was taken by 
Vyshinsky, who had earlier been a prosecutor in the show trials of the 1930s. Vyshinsky 
adhered to the notion that formal law was subordinate to the law of the revolution, so that 
‘collisions must be solved only by subordination of the formal commands of the law to those 
of party policy’.53  
 
2.3 The demise of Soviet law 
 
In his report on the draft 1936 Constitution, Stalin declared that ‘the complete victory of the 
socialist system in all spheres of national economy is now a fact.’  This meant ‘that the 
exploitation of men by men has been abolished, eliminated, while the socialist ownership of 
the implements and means of production has been established as the unshakeable foundation 
of our socialist society’.54  At the same time, the Constitution embodied a principle which 
Stalin referred to as the ‘stability of the laws’.55  Writing from exile in 1937, Trotsky 
commented that that the Soviet state, far from withering away, had ‘grown into a hitherto 
unheard of apparatus of compulsion’.56  Thus the legal theory of transition contributed to the 
emergence of a jurisprudence of terror; Pashukanis’s attempts to redefine the state during the 
transition period in accordance with the Stalinist conception of socialist legality, at the same 
time as maintaining his view of criminal law as withering away to technical rules designed to 
protect society,
 
opened the door to a vague and flexible ‘Soviet criminal policy’ in which the 
judicial process was subordinated to political ends.  Soviet law, although clothed by the 
notion of ‘socialist legality’, became little more than the expression of the will of the party-
state, while Soviet legal theory was reduced to a ‘vulgar neo-positivist jurisprudence’.57 
 
After the terror of the purges subsided and the Soviet society recovered from wartime 
devastation, the formal economy was run as a command system.  The state sector coexisted, 
however, with a large informal economy in which criminal interests were intermingled with 
those of the nomenklatura.  The inability of the legal system to uphold basic entitlements 
contributed to the creation of a series of informal and quasi-normative systems which were 
not sponsored by the state, and were largely antagonistic to the teleological project which the 
state continued to maintain, but which constituted the rules according to which much of 
society actually functioned.  Breaking down these systems and substituting them with the 
official legal system became one of the main obstacles to reform.  Hopes were placed in the 
‘emergence of a superior type of Soviet man’58 who would be both spontaneously more 
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52
  Cited in Berman 1963, p 55. 
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Entsiklopedia (1933), p. 86, cited in Guins 1954, p 73. 
54
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compliant as well as more productive than his non-Marxist counterpart.  In practice, it was 
the limited efficiency of the economy rather than inherent deficiencies in human psychology 
which ensured that ‘devotion to social interests, readiness to privation and harsh discipline 
instead of private interest, self-concern and freedom of choice’59 characterised economic life 
in the Soviet Union.  Even before the political collapse of the early 1990s, the Soviet system 
was failing economically.
60
  The transition process, along with ‘Soviet law’, had reached a 
dead end. 
 
3.  The second transition: neoclassical law and economics and ‘shock therapy’ in the 
1990s 
 
3.1 The law and economics of transition 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was welcomed in Europe and America as signifying ‘not 
just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history’ but, 
more fundamentally, ‘the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form 
of human government’.61  For the states of the former communist bloc, this implied a second 
transition, away from state ownership and organisation of the economy, towards a market-
based social and economic order.  Neoclassical economic theory provided the intellectual 
bedrock for this process.  Neoclassical theory was already the dominant paradigm in 
economics and increasingly influential across the social sciences and in legal analysis; it 
received further legitimation from the fall of communism.  
 
At the core of neoclassical economics is a set of interlocking axioms concerning human 
behaviour and social structure.  In the influential formulation offered by the Chicago-based 
economist Gary Becker in The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (1976), economic 
analysis is founded on ‘the combined assumptions of maximising behaviour, market 
equilibrium and stable preferences’, which, if applied ‘relentlessly and unflinchingly’, can be 
used to explain a wide range of social institutions, including, but not limited to, those 
conventionally identified with the ‘market sector’.62  The assumptions of maximisation and 
preference stability combine to form the rational actor model, which posits that voluntary 
trades made by individuals reflect their subjective wants.  The market equilibrium assumption 
maintains that prices and related market mechanisms operate to allocate the scarce resources 
of a society in a value-enhancing or, in some versions, optimising way.  Becker himself 
accepted that not all participants in a market ‘necessarily have complete information or 
engage in costless transactions’,63 but declined to draw the conclusion that these 
imperfections subverted the assumption of equilibrium. In this he was following the example 
of the neoclassical mainstream which, in the middle decades of the twentieth century, was 
preoccupied with modelling the mathematical properties of markets characterised by perfect 
competition.
64
  This body of work had a normative dimension, since it could be deduced from 
the operation of basic axioms that in economies defined by stable market equilibria, resources 
would be allocated to their most efficient use, and that the aggregate well being of all market 
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60
  Reddaway and Glinski 2001, ch 2. 
61
  Fukuyama1989, p 1. 
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  Becker 1976, p 5. 
63
  Becker 1976, p 6. 
64
  The high water mark of this approach was Arrow and Hahn 1971. 
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participants would thereby be maximised.  It was a short step from these ‘fundamental 
theorems’65 to the conclusion that competitive markets represented the optimal design mode 
for the economy and, more generally, for social institutions characterised by explicit or 
implicit price effects, which in Becker’s view was, presumptively, all of them, including the 
state and the family. 
 
The mathematical formalisation of the model of market equilibrium had only been achieved 
by putting to one side questions of the role of the legal system and other aspects of the 
institutional environment in underpinning exchange relations.  From the early 1960s onwards, 
however, a body of work developed which addressed the role of law in a market-based 
economy in a more systematic way.  This departed from the assumption of costless 
contracting which was inherent in equilibrium-based modelling, and in so doing assigned a 
role to the law and related institutional mechanisms in reducing or otherwise mitigating the 
effects of transaction costs and related barriers to efficient exchange.  R.H. Coase’s article 
‘The Problem of Social Cost’, published in 1960,66 was the first step in this process, which 
was to lead to the emergence in the 1970s of the neoclassical economic analysis of law
67
 or, 
as it became known, ‘law and economics’, the field defining itself as ‘the application of 
economic theory and econometric methods to the formation, structure, processes and impact 
of law and legal institutions’.68 
 
Coase is generally taken to have shown in ‘The problem of social cost’ that legal rules 
assigning rights and liabilities between private economic actors can address externalities 
(unbargained for third-party effects which prevent optimal resource allocations) more 
effectively than government action such as regulation and taxation.  The so-called ‘invariance 
theorem’ presented by Coase (although not named as such by him69) predicts that in a world 
of zero transaction costs, however legal rights are initially assigned, the parties will bargain 
their way to an efficient allocation which maximises their joint product.  One reading of the 
Coase theorem, although by no means the only possible one, is that as long as legal rights of 
some kind are assigned to the parties, it does not matter, from the point of view of efficiency, 
who acquires them.
70
  The principal role of the law is to assign the ‘property rights’ which 
form the building blocks of economic exchange.  It is clear from the text of ‘The problem of 
social cost’ that the ‘invariance theorem’ only holds if contracting is costless: ‘the ultimate 
result… is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work without 
cost’.71  Coase subsequently emphasised that his approach was not concerned with the 
                                                          
65
  The first of the two ‘fundamental theorems’ of welfare economics holds that a market 
equilibrium will result in a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources, that is to say, one in which 
there is no further scope for distributional changes that improve the welfare of some agents 
without imposing losses on others.  The second theorem, which is the converse of the first, 
states that assuming consistent preferences (‘convexity’), any Pareto-optimal allocation can 
be modelled as a competitive market equilibrium.   This is widely taken to mean that policy 
makers should ‘let the market work’ in order to arrive at allocations which maximise resource 
efficiency.  See Varian 1974, p 223. 
66
  Coase 1960, p 1. 
67
  Posner 1970.   
68
  Mackaay 1995, p 65. 
69
  The invention of the term ‘Coase theorem’ appears to be attributable to George Stigler: 
Stigler 1966, p 113. 
70
  On the range of possible interpretations of the Coase theorem, see Cooter 1982, p 1. 
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  Coase 1960, p 8. 
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properties of this zero transaction cost world, a state of affairs which he regarded as both 
empirically implausible and logically impossible.
72
  Instead, he argued for a research project 
which would look at ways in which institutions of different kinds responded to the presence 
of transaction costs in particular settings.  In the positive transaction cost world, which is the 
actual one, there is no necessary relationship between efficiency and private law; whether 
private law solutions offer better outcomes, from an efficiency perspective, than regulation or 




In the former communist bloc after the fall of the Berlin Wall, policy took the form of ‘the 
administrative imposition of standards of economic development considered to be “Western” 
and [hence] universally applicable’.74  In fact, neoclassical economic theory did not have a 
well worked-out position on how a market economy might be instituted, as opposed to how it 
worked once it was in place. Writing in 1992 about the transition to a market economy in 
central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Coase commented that ‘if we knew 
more about our own economy, we would be in a better position to advise them’.75 Instead, a 
simplified version of the Coase theorem was advanced as the basis for structural reform, 
according to which it was essential to initiate the transition process by dismantling state 
ownership and regulation of the economy, and re-establishing private property rights as the 
basis for exchange.  The ‘invariance theorem’ was invoked to support the claim that it did not 
matter how property rights were allocated; as long as they were clearly assigned, bargaining 
would ensure that they were subsequently directed towards their most efficient use.
76
   
 
It was argued that the process of liberalisation did not need to wait until the institutions of the 
market, including a functioning system of private law, were fully in place.
77
  Instead, once the 
transition process was initiated, property owners would begin to demand the protections 
which the law was able to provide.
78
 It would therefore be better to allow the legal system 
and related institutions to emerge spontaneously in response to the changing structure of the 
economy than to impose a particular model of legal ordering at the outset.
79
  According to the 
neoclassically trained advocates of mass privatisation in Russia, the ‘consumers’ of legal 
rules in a market-based economy – individuals and businesses – would rationally demand 
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Roland 2000, p 85.   
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legal protection for property and contract rights, which, in turn, would be supplied by the 
legal system.
80
  Thus the precise content of private law rules mattered less, to begin with at 
least, than the fundamental ‘structural’ reform of moving to an economy based on private 
property and freedom of contract.  
 
The reformers did not advocate a legal vacuum; it was acknowledged that a well functioning 
court system would be needed to assist the move to the market.  Theory suggested that legal 
structures in the early stages of the transition should be as ‘simple’ as possible. Richard 
Posner, leading exponent of Chicago-school law and economics and already at that stage an 
experienced appellate-level judge in the US federal court system, influentially argued that the 
appropriate legal framework for transition systems would be one based on ‘bright-line rules’ 
which could be easily applied, as opposed to ‘principles’ which it would be open to courts to 
interpret in a flexible way.  Relatedly, he suggested that the reform process should focus on 
the creation of ‘rules’ from which a large number of economic actors would benefit 





3.2 Economic theory and ‘shock therapy’  
 
Neoclassical law and economics dovetailed with more general arguments for the efficiency of 
market-based economic ordering to justify a transformative programme of ‘shock therapy’ 
which began almost immediately following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 
summer of 1991.  The origins of the policy lay in a report on the Soviet economy jointly 
prepared by the IMF, OECD and EBRD in January 1991.  This argued for rapid price 
liberalisation and privatisation, and for a macroeconomic policy based on tight control of the 
money supply, high interest rates and ‘hard budget constraints’ for the public sector.  In 
December 1991 a decree removed controls on 80% of producer goods and 90% of consumer 
goods. In January 1992 a free trade decree abolished the permit system which had previously 
controlled the trading of goods.  A programme of mass privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises was initiated from the autumn of 1992.  Each Russian citizen was assigned a 
privatisation voucher worth 10,000 roubles (then equivalent to $20). Vouchers could be sold, 
exchanged for shares in privatised companies, or invested in collective investment vehicles 
known as ‘voucher funds’.  By the end of December 1992 47,000 state-owned companies had 
been privatised, and a year later the figure had reached 90,000.
82
  
                                                          
80
  Boycko et al. 1995. As Stiglitz has observed, the application of the neoclassical model of 
utility maximisation could lead individuals to vote rationally to ‘postpone the establishment 
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Rapid transition was supported by the IMF, western countries and the Yeltsin government on 
the grounds that it would prevent the reconstruction of the Soviet state apparatus.  Yeltsin’s 
government took the view that a top-down transformation of the economy would provide the 
stimulus needed to initiate the move to a market economy: ‘free prices must become the 
means to achieve a growth in production, and this will in future set a limit to price 
increases’.83  Once state planning was abolished and government itself made subject to 
market forces, ‘rational’ economic behaviour would follow, and a market equilibrium 
achieved: ‘the government must limit its activity in the economic sphere to the maximum 
extent possible and let the market, money and entrepreneurs work’.84   
 
In practice, many of the voucher funds set up to channel investments in privatised companies 
turned out to be pyramid schemes, and most paid no dividends. The trading of vouchers 
resulted in the concentration of ownership in the hands of the former managers and civil 
servants who were now running most of the former state-owned enterprises, but fewer than 
14% of privatisations took the form of public auctions in any event.  Most were arranged 
bilaterally under the supervision of the government-run State Property Management 
Committee, chaired by the minister and free-market advocate, Anatoly Chubais.  The 
emergence of a small group of economic ‘oligarchs’, named as such by the former Soviet 
dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn in a speech to the Russian parliament as early as October 
1994,
85
 was consolidated by the ‘loans for shares’ scheme initiated in 1995, under which the 
government transferred shares in state-owned enterprises to banks and other private-sector 
entities owned or controlled by a number of oligarchs as security for loans. When the loans 
were not repaid on time, the lenders retained the shares.
86
    
 
The immediate impacts of ‘shock therapy’ included record price inflation and a dramatic drop 
in GDP.
87
  Neoclassical economic theory was invoked to justify the overall direction of 
policy.  Since the laws of economics were ‘like the laws of engineering’ so that ‘one set of 
laws works everywhere’,88 the market itself could not be to blame.  Empirical research 
carried out in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union had suggested that 
‘Soviet man’ was really ‘economic man’ at heart and would respond to market incentives in 
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  With the transition process apparently stalling, ‘Russian cultural 
inferiority’90 was blamed for the failure of ‘market stimuli’ to produce ‘the expected 
behavioural changes’ on the part of economic actors.91 A novel form of social Darwinism 
was applied to rationalise the ‘survival of the fittest’ in the harsh transition environment, 
coupled with the view that ‘everything that is economically efficient is morally acceptable’.92  
Inverting earlier Marxist debates, Russia’s ‘backwardness’ was held to justify a period of 
‘primitive accumulation’ as it sought to catch up with the West. Things were worse than the 
reformers could have imagined – ‘when we placed the patient on the operating table and 
opened him up, we found that his anatomical structure and internal organs were completely 
different, of a kind we never encountered’93 – but Russia was now in the process of becoming 
a ‘normal country’.94  Reforms had if anything been ‘too slow and partial’.95 Shock therapy 
was not a mistake, it had not been properly implemented: ‘particularly from a structural 
viewpoint… we needed to reduce aggregate government spending’.96  
 
3.3 Corporate governance, ownership concentration and the return of the state 
 
Gorbachev had initiated law reform in the late 1980s as part of his perestroika programme in 
an attempt to stimulate the economy, but as in the period of the NEP seventy years earlier the 
new laws permitting commercial activity, which were inspired by the decrees of the early 
Soviet government under the NEP, sat uncomfortably with the prevailing communist order. 
The Soviet system in its final years ‘permitted the autocracy to hold a monopoly of political 
power while allowing a limited amount of autonomy to capitalist energies’.97 Among these 
legislative reforms were the Law on Individual Labour Activity in 1986, the Law on State 
Enterprises 1987, the Law on Cooperative Systems of 1988, the Law on Leasing in 1989 and 
the Law on Ownership in 1990. Limited commercial activity was thereby encouraged during 
the perestroika period, but not only was this potentially contradictory from an ideological 
point of view, it also contravened the criminal law at the time, which still made commercial 
activity illegal as speculation. However it did help to prepare the way for the more radical 
reforms that were to follow.  
 
Comprehensive legal reconstruction in post-Soviet Russia emerged in the aftermath of 
privatisation and market liberalisation, and, like them, was shaped by the logic of an 
economically-driven transition process.  The first part of a new Civil Code was introduced in 
1994 and a land code permitting transactions in real property did not come into force until 
2001, more than three years after a law allowing mortgages over land.  The Joint Stock 
Companies Law, introduced in 1995, was influenced by the perceived need to have ‘simple, 
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bright-line rules and strong remedies’98 in order to counter ‘insider-controlled companies, 
malfunctioning courts, weak and sometimes corrupt regulators, and poorly developed capital 
markets’.99 The law was designed to be ‘self-enforcing’ in the sense that would ‘minimise 
reliance on official enforcement’100 in favour of harnessing the ‘monitoring ability of outside 
shareholders’. External directors and shareholders would ‘police the opportunism of 
managers and controlling shareholders’ while the law would ‘elicit a substantial measure 
voluntary compliance’ from the latter.101 This was to be achieved through a mixture of 
procedural mechanisms and external control rights modelled on the shareholder-rights 
orientated models of US and, even more so, UK company law and takeover regulation. 
 
The passage of the Joint Stock Companies Law did not prevent the consolidation of corporate 
ownership and control in the hands of the new oligarchical elite following the loans for shares 
scheme.
102
  The trajectory of the oil company Yukos illustrates some of the ways in which the 
law was circumvented at this time.  Yukos was privatised with a multi-layered organisational 
and management structure. Its principal production subsidiary, Yuganskneftegaz, had its own 
management organs, and continued to function as a separate organisation.  Yukos’s new 
owners faced the challenge of creating a unified company with a single overall administrative 
framework. Product and revenue streams were first brought under control by forcing the 
production subsidiaries to sell oil cheaply to the parent company, which then sold it on with a 
view realising a significant profit (transfer pricing), in the process weakening the position of 
the subsidiary. Minority shareholders in the production subsidiaries then saw their rights 
eliminated.  This was done by a combination of share dilution, physically preventing minority 
shareholders from attending meetings, and abuse of the legal process.
103
  The US minority 
investor, Kenneth Dart, was deprived of his share of Yukos subsidiary profits through 
transfer pricing.
104
  The ‘interested party’ provisions of the Joint Stock Companies Law were 
circumvented by the obscurity of the ultimate shareholding structure, making it impossible to 
determine whether or not the relevant provisions were actually triggered. The result of this 
manoeuvring was that Yukos ended up as a coherent vertically integrated structure, ready 
then to try and improve its image for corporate governance in the realisation that perceived 
quality of corporate governance has a significant impact on a company’s market 
capitalisation.
105
  Yukos went from one of the most notorious perpetrators of investor rights 
abuses in 1999, to lead the growth in the corporate governance ratings of the Russian Institute 
of Corporate Law and Corporate Governance. Over the period from January 2001 to April 
2002 its capitalisation grew by 5 times, while during the same period the RTS
106
 index only 
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  The company was transformed from having one of the worst corporate 
governance records to being one of the best governed (or least that was the reputation it 




One of the aims of rapid privatisation had been to make it infeasible for government to 
resume a dominant role in economic planning.  In the event, the return of the state was not 
long delayed.    Shortly after Putin became president a meeting was held with twenty-one 
representatives of big business, on 28 July 2000, allegedly to extract from the oligarchs an 
agreement to stay out of politics, in exchange for which the legitimacy of the privatisations 
would not be challenged.
109
  It is generally believed that the attack on Yukos by the Russian 
government from 2003-2005 was a consequence of Khodorkovsky’s refusal to abide by the 
July 2000 agreement to stay out of politics. There may have been another reason, not 
altogether inconsistent with the first, which is that Putin had a particular vision of how he 
wanted the Russian economy to be structured, and that Khodorkovsky’s intention to sell a 
major stake in Yukos to an overseas-based multinational oil company was inconsistent with 
this. 
  
In 1997 Putin had defended a thesis in economics at the St. Petersburg Mining Institute.  
Although the thesis itself became classified information when he was appointed prime 
minister in 1999,
110
  Putin also published an article which may be presumed to have reflected 
the conclusions of the thesis, and which is also consistent with the policy subsequently 
pursued by his administration in the energy sector. From what it has been possible to glean 
from reports about the thesis, it considers the importance of natural resources in the 
development of the St Petersburg/Leningrad region, and the need for strategic planning to 
develop those resources and the accompanying transportation facilities. Putin’s published 
article argued that, used effectively, mineral resources could provide the basis for Russia’s 
entry into the world economy and for the modernisation of the country’s military-industrial 
complex. This strategy would also, the article argued, promote social stability and raise the 
well being of the population, critical issues for the state at a period when the transition 
process has become associated with growing inequalities.  Putin advocated the creation of 
vertically integrated financial industrial groups, supported by state agencies, to compete with 
Western multinationals, as well as the need to create the right economic conditions for 
foreign investment in appropriate circumstances. The resources sector was too important to 
be left to the market while the transition continued: ‘a contemporary strategy for rational use 
of resources cannot be based exclusively on the possibilities of the market. This applies even 
more to conditions of economic development in a transition, and, thus, to the Russian 
economy’.111 
 
With the state-led dismemberment of Yukos, the second transition had reached a turning 
point, in very different circumstances from the first one, but equally definitively. As in the 
1920s, within a decade or so of the launching of a transformative experiment in economic and 
social ordering, an alternative pathway for transition was being set out.  Russia entered the 
2000s under a political leadership determined to reassert the authority of the central state in 
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the management of the economy, to the extent that it was soon being compared to such earlier 
models of ‘market authoritarianism’ as Pinochet-era Chile.112 
 
4. Assessment: identifying the role of legal institutions in economic transition 
 
Why did the reforms of the 1990s prove to have limited success in implanting notions of 
legality in economic and business life?  The idea that Russia is inherently unsuited to the 
model of the rule of law relies on broad-brush characterisations which can easily slip into 
cultural stereotyping of the kind which was widespread among foreign officials and experts 
in the 1990s.  The idea of the rule of law is far from alien to Russian constitutional traditions 
and practice.  The 1993 Russian Constitution declares Russia to be a ‘democratic rule of law 
state’113 and the term used to express this concept, pravovoe gosudarstvo, has a long history, 
having been used in the nineteenth century by analogy to the German concept of the 
Rechtsstaat, and again in the late 1980s  during  Gorbachev’s reforms.   
 
Nor is there evidence to suggest that the rule of law is not valued in Russia.   Recent 
sociological research
114
 suggests that in contemporary Russia there is pent-up demand for the 
neutral application of legal rules, and for the protection of the legal system to be extended to 
private citizens in their everyday dealing with business and government.  At the same time 
there is a continuing lack of confidence in law and the legal system among ordinary people in 
Russia: law is perceived more as a ‘sword’ than as a ‘shield’, that is to say, as another 
weapon in the armoury which can be deployed in conjunction with other methods of 
persuasion or coercion to achieve a result. Unlike in more established democracies, its role as 
essentially protective, whether of human rights or of property rights, is not a primary 
characteristic. Russian courts are perceived as being rigidly bureaucratic, particularly at lower 
instances, in their interpretation of the law. Judges are career civil servants and the 
bureaucratic approach appears to be a legacy of Soviet times as well as, in some cases, a 
result of a lack of a thorough grasp of the implications of market transactions. Although it 
may contribute to legal certainty, a restrictive or bureaucratic approach to interpretation is a 




Meanwhile, market exchange is still highly personalised, and there is a convergence of 
wealth and power, or in other words of business and the state, which enjoy a mutually 
beneficial relationship which excludes outsiders.  The vast majority of the population, who 
are outside this elite group, would be powerless to promote or protect their interests, 
including through the legal system, if they conflicted with the interests of those with wealth, 
political influence or both. The situation has deteriorated by comparison with the position in 
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the latter Soviet period, as throughout most of the Soviet period there was little personal 




There are those who would see an essential continuity between the limited role of legal 
ordering in contemporary Russia, and the country’s long history of weak legal institutions.117   
Our review of the transition experience in the preceding sections suggests, however, that 
more specific causes can be identified for the failure of the ‘second’ transition.118  The first 
relates to the sequencing of economic and legal reform.  The policy of transferring ownership 
to the private sector before an adequate legal infrastructure was in place was expected to 
stimulate demand for legal reforms, but in fact failed to achieve this: ‘the immediate 
establishment of the rule of law imposes a cost on asset-strippers and some individuals will 
rationally vote to postpone the establishment of the rule of law state’.119  As two of the 
drafters of the companies law wrote in 2000, ‘the right response may be to stage privatisation 
and work hard to develop this infrastructure rather than privatise large firms anyway and 
hope that the outcome will somehow be acceptable’.120  The problem was exacerbated by the 
institution-undermining effects of shock therapy: ‘economic revolutions that destroy 
institutions before new ones can be built are… likely to founder’.121  Other commentators 
have noted the negative consequences of placing economic reform ahead of legal institution 
building.  Improvements in the law came ‘too late to further the intended reallocation of 
rights’ once concentrations of power had been allowed to form; the ‘new owners of private 
property’ simply failed to demand the ‘infrastructural reform’ that had been anticipated. 
Privatisation was ‘meaningless if you don’t have the rule of law’, since the end of state 
control meant nothing ‘if you do not have security of property, if you can’t use your property 
as you want to’.122   
 
A second factor was the failure to invest sufficiently in state capacity, or even to maintain 
such capacity as existed, during the transition period. The drafters of the Joint Stock 
Companies Law suggested that the error had been to ‘underestimate the extent to which 
functioning law requires honest courts that can redress gross violations’.123 Courts, they 
argued, ‘were of little help even when self-dealing was obvious’. This view, however, 
underplays the sense in which the Joint Stock Companies Law was the product of a 
philosophy which regarded public institutions in general, and in particular those inherited 
from the Soviet period, were inherently inefficient and corrupt, but which expected private 
business managers, by contrast, to act on the basis of an enlightened self-interest.  A more 
critical perspective on the assumptions inherent in the neoclassical economic model might 
have cautioned against the view that ‘economic interest is pursued only by comparatively 
gentlemanly means’.124 
 
                                                          
116
 On these points, see Ledeneva and Kurkchiyan (eds.) 2000; Ledeneva 2001; Alena V. 
Ledeneva, ‘Organized Crime in Russia Today’ in Galeotti (ed.) 2002; Hendley 2010; 
Hendley 2011. 
117
 Hedlund 2005. 
118
  Ibid. 
119
  Hoff and Stiglitz 2002. 
120
  Black, Kraakman and Tarrassova 2000, p 1737. 
121
  Ibid, p 1803. 
122
  Milton Friedman, writing in his preface to a 2002 World Bank Report: Friedman 2002.  
123
  Black, Kraakman and Tarrassova 2000, p 1731. 
124
  Granovetter 1985, p 488. 
 20 
 
The chaos and opportunism of the immediate post-Soviet period was fed by the need for the 
population to adjust from an environment in which entrepreneurial activity was essentially 
illegal, to one in which almost any profit making activity was de facto permissible, and more 
unscrupulous elements took advantage of the absence of effective regulation and a proper 
institutional framework for market activity.
125
 The task of rebuilding Russia became not just 
one of managing the transition from communism to capitalism, but of creating a functioning 
market system from the ‘economy of collapse’ which ensued the collapse of the Soviet 
system, and which led to ideal conditions for criminals to flourish.
126
 According to an 
MVD
127
 investigator, ‘Perestroika was the real beginning of organized crime in our 
country’128 and the cause was that ‘Russian policymakers committed a fundamental mistake: 
they tried to develop a free market before constructing a civil society in which such a market 
could safely operate’.129 The policy of reform had overlooked the extent to which so-called 
‘free markets’ in established market economies are in fact highly regulated and benefit from a 




5.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have argued that the way law is theorised in relation to the process of 
economic development, and specifically with regard to transition, has a critical role to play in 
generating a more complete understanding of how market economies are constituted and how 
they are sustained.  In the case of Russia, theories of law and the economy informed the 
transition process at either end of the twentieth century. These were theories that modelled 
the legal process in terms of an all-encompassing economic logic, which reduced legal 
phenomena to economic categories, and assumed, in a deterministic fashion, that legal 
change was economically driven.  In the case of Marxism, the historical-material process of 
economic evolution in conjunction with revolutionary political change together dictated the 
form of law.  In the case of neoclassical economics, the fundamental axioms of rational 
economic behaviour and market equilibrium were supposed to perform the corresponding 
function, in this case creating a demand for market-enabling rules.  In the first case the 
application of Marxist principles in post-revolutionary Russia led eventually to a conception 
of law that abandoned liberal notions of justice and human rights in favour of revolutionary 
expediency. In the second case a form of market-enabling legislation was implemented but 
law failed to emerge and occupy the place it was expected to in a market system.  The 
predicted positive feedback from the economy to the legal system has not materialised, with 
the result that the legal system is failing reliably to perform what economists perceive as its 
essential function in a market economy – the protection of property rights together with, more 
generally, institutional support for market activity. 
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The emergence of societies which are now stable rule of law states was undoubtedly turbulent 
at various stages of their history. In Russia’s case, the emergence of the rule of law was 
hindered by a preoccupation with determinist economic thinking at either ends of the short 
twentieth century which began with the Bolshevik Revolution and ended with the fall of the 
Berlin Wall.  It is inherent in both Marxism, and the neoclassical economic theory which 
underpinned reforms in Russia after the fall of communism, that after a period of transition, 
the ideal form of society will emerge as a natural consequence of the application of the 
theory. Destined in the first case to ‘wither away’, and in the second to develop 
spontaneously in response to demand from an essentially unregulated market, in the event the 
legal system did neither.  In the case of the Soviet Union, the result was a descent into 
authoritarianism. In the context of contemporary Russia, the rule of law state remains, at best, 
an unrealised goal.  While path dependence may have shaped Russia’s transition to a market 
economy during the 1990s, accounts which stress the role of history and culture risk falling 
into stereotyping.  Specific policy decisions, informed by economic theory which was remote 
from the realities of transition, played their part in setting Russia on a path which today is far 
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